The hard set (5 questions)
The hardest MD-102 questions this guide publishes, none of them repeated from the placement quiz above: the answer first, why every other option is wrong, and the Microsoft Learn page behind it. The practice book for this exam holds the full bank.
Three separate Intune Antivirus (endpoint security) policies each define a different set of Microsoft Defender Antivirus file path exclusions, and all three are assigned to the same device. What is the resulting behavior on that device?
Correct answer: A. The exclusions are combined into a single superset, and all exclusions from the three policies apply.
Defender Antivirus exclusion settings (Excluded Paths, Excluded Processes, Excluded Extensions) support policy merge, so Intune evaluates all applicable policies and combines their exclusions into a single superset delivered to the device. The most-secure / last-modified / none tiebreakers apply only to settings that do not support policy merge.
Why the other options are wrong:
- B. No policy delivered is the outcome for non-mergeable settings that cannot be resolved, not for mergeable exclusions.
- C. Most secure wins is the resolution for non-merge settings, not for mergeable exclusions.
- D. Last modified wins is a tiebreaker for non-merge settings, not for exclusions that merge into a superset.
Memory hook: Exclusions merge into a superset - paths, processes, extensions.
Microsoft Learn: Antivirus
A Windows device managed by Endpoint Privilege Management receives two elevation rules that both match the same executable: a device-targeted rule with elevation type Automatic, and a user-targeted rule with elevation type Deny. When the signed-in user launches the file, what happens?
Correct answer: A. The user-targeted Deny rule wins and the file is blocked from running elevated.
When multiple elevation rules match one application, EPM resolves them so that rules with elevation type Deny always take precedence, and rules deployed to a user take precedence over rules deployed to a device. Both factors point to the Deny rule here, so the elevation is denied.
Why the other options are wrong:
- B. Device rules do not win; user rules take precedence over device rules, and Deny outranks Automatic regardless.
- C. A Deny rule blocks elevation; it does not silently auto-elevate the file.
- D. Reverting to default client behavior is how EPM handles conflicting elevation settings policies, not two rules matching one app.
Memory hook: Deny always wins; user beats device.
Microsoft Learn: Deployment planning
You are building a Conditional Access "Filter for devices" rule that must also apply to devices which were never registered in Microsoft Entra ID (for example, personal, unmanaged machines). Which statement correctly describes how Entra evaluates the filter and how you should write the rule so unregistered devices are included?
Correct answer: C. Entra evaluates filters using device authentication; for unregistered devices all device properties are null, so use a negative operator (for example device.extensionAttribute1 -ne "SAW") so the configured rule still applies.
Microsoft Entra uses device authentication to evaluate filter rules. A device that is unregistered does not exist in the directory, so all of its device properties are treated as null. A positive operator only matches devices that exist and match, so the recommended way to target unregistered devices is a negative operator - the configured filter rule then applies to them.
Why the other options are wrong:
- A. Unregistered devices are not in the directory and have no trustType at all; Workplace denotes Microsoft Entra registered devices.
- B. Filters can target unregistered devices via negative operators; Device state is deprecated and should not be reintroduced.
- D. Entra evaluates device identity from the directory via device authentication, not by reading a TPM; positive operators match only existing directory objects.
Memory hook: Unregistered = null properties; negative operators still bite, positive operators miss.
Microsoft Learn: Concept condition filters for devices
You manage Microsoft Defender Antivirus exclusions exclusively through Intune and want those exclusions to also be protected by tamper protection so a local administrator can't remove them. Besides meeting the minimum Defender platform version and onboarding to Defender for Endpoint, which additional setting must you configure on the devices?
Correct answer: A. Set DisableLocalAdminMerge to true (enabled).
For antivirus exclusions to be tamper-protected, exclusions must be managed in Intune (or Configuration Manager) only, the device must run a supported Defender platform, and DisableLocalAdminMerge must be enabled so local exclusion lists don't merge with the org-managed policy.
Why the other options are wrong:
- B. Tamper protection scope controls which devices receive tamper protection, not whether exclusions are protected from tampering.
- C. AllowLocalPolicyMerge is the opposite intent; allowing local merges defeats exclusion tamper protection.
- D. LSA protection guards credentials in the LSASS process; it has nothing to do with tamper-protecting antivirus exclusions.
Memory hook: Protect exclusions: kill the merge - DisableLocalAdminMerge = true.
Microsoft Learn: Manage tamper protection Intune
Microsoft Entra registered devices (workplace-joined) are present in a tenant alongside Microsoft Entra joined and hybrid joined devices. An administrator wants to use Intune Feature Update policies, Quality Update policies, and Driver Update policies to manage all Windows devices. Which device join type is NOT supported by these update policy types that use the Windows Autopatch backend?
Correct answer: D. Microsoft Entra registered (workplace-joined) devices
Feature Update policies, Quality Update policies, and Driver Update policies in Intune are orchestrated by Windows Autopatch. Microsoft's documentation explicitly states that Microsoft Entra registered devices (workplace-joined, also known as WPJ) are not supported for any policy type that uses the Windows Autopatch backend. For these devices, update management is limited to Windows Update client policies and Update ring policies only.
Why the other options are wrong:
- A. Devices enrolled via Windows Autopilot user-driven mode are typically Microsoft Entra joined or hybrid joined. The join type, not the enrollment method, determines Autopatch eligibility.
- B. Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices meet the prerequisites for Windows Autopatch-based update policies and are supported for all three update policy types.
- C. Microsoft Entra joined devices are fully supported for Feature Update, Quality Update, and Driver Update policies through the Windows Autopatch backend.
Memory hook: WPJ (registered only, no join) = no Autopatch policies. Joined devices (Entra or hybrid) = full update policy support.
Microsoft Learn: Windows update for business configure